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2 widen the scope of s 6(3)(b) to encompass a greater range of functions performed by private bodies.
In substance, then, the hybrid scheme is one of horizontal effectwhat may be termed 'public liability' horizontality. 4 Section 6(3)(b) may treat private bodies performing public functions as public authorities for the purpose of furnishing claimants with a Conventionbased cause of action to bring them to court, but they must be treated by the court as private bodies for the different purpose of allowing them to rely on their own Convention rights. To ensure that the Convention rights of hybrid public authorities are fully protected, the hybrid scheme should be read, it is suggested, as generating 'chameleonic' horizontal effect. Aside from guaranteeing hybrids' Convention rights, the chameleonic model should appeal to the courts for the additional reason that it produces a form of horizontal effect not dissimilar in scope and effect from that which they have already endorsed in the parallel common law context mentioned above.
The chapter begins by introducing the basic problems with the courts' approach to s 6(3) (b) and discusses why hybrids should be regarded as capable of relying on their own Convention rights under the HRA. It then considers the importance of the chameleonic model and how the model derives additional support from the courts' case law on common law horizontal effect.
A. The hybrid issue 3 There are two main problems with the courts' approach to the hybrid scheme. The first is that they appear to have taken too narrow an interpretation of the term 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b). It is clear from the case law that s 6(3)(b) applies to relatively straightforward examples of public activity such as the exercise by a private organisation of statutory coercive powers. 5 The courts have also held, again not controversially, that s 6(3)(b) will apply to the actions of a private organisation which is created and assisted by a local authority to take over the running of a particular public service. 6 But beyond these contexts claimants have found it notoriously difficult to persuade the courts that a defendant exercises public functions. In particular, the courts have held that the delivery of contracted out public services by a private organisation acting on behalf of central or local government, of itself, is not a public function. 7 This is of especial concern given that contracting out has now become an accepted and widespread method of delivering such services. 8 In R (Heather) v Leonard Cheshire Foundation, 9 the appellants were placed by their local authority in a private care home run by LCF, a charity who delivered the services on the local authority's behalf. LCF later decided to close the home and the appellants claimed that this would amount to a breach by LCF of their right to a home life under Art 8. The Court of Appeal held that LCF was not performing public functions when delivering the residential care services. Giving the judgment of the court, Lord Woolf CJ emphasised that LCF's functions were private even as public under the HRA when contracted out to be performed by a private organisation on the local authority's behalf. 15 The majority of the House of Lords in YL made a number of attempts to explain this argument away, but none were particularly convincing. 16 In particular, their Lordships believed that the performance of functions for commercial gain 'point[ed] against' those functions being public. 17 They seemed to believe the dividing line between 'public' and 'private' under s 6(3)(b), in other words, to mirror the classically liberal distinction between the public-facing state and the self-interested private individual; between bodies created and controlled by law and politics to serve the public interest, on the one hand, and bodies who are entitled to act for their own (lawful) ends, on the other. 18 Though such a divide does appear to run through Strasbourg's jurisprudence on the distinction between governmental and non-governmental organisations under the Convention, 19 it is clear that s 6(3)(b) intends the public-private divide to be drawn in a different place. Excluding commercially-motivated activity from s 6(3)(b) tends to empty it of any real purpose as a provision intended to apply to private bodiesbodies who, by their very nature in liberal societies, are entitled to act for their own motivations rather than being bound to serve the public interest. 20 Excluding 6 commercially motivated activity would even seem, as one commentator has observed, 21 to conflict with the uncontroversial ruling of Keith J in R (A) v Partnerships in Care Ltd 22 by excluding the exercise of statutory powers of detention by a private psychiatric hospital from s 6(3)(b). The YL reasoning is highly questionable from a doctrinal perspective and the meaning of the term 'functions of a public nature' should therefore still be a live issue for the Supreme Court.
The second problem with the courts' approach to the hybrid scheme is the confusion surrounding the Convention rights of hybrid public authorities themselves. The issue has never been comprehensively addressed in court, 23 and Buxton LJ once curtly stated that when discharging its public functions a hybrid 'has no such rights'. 24 The view that hybrid public authorities are somehow 'stripped' of the ability to rely on the Convention in their public capacities is also held, again with little or no supporting analysis, by a surprising number of academic writers. 25 Issues one and twothe width of s 6(3)(b) and the ability of hybrids to rely on the Convention themselvesare bound to be linked. 26 26 On the link between a public authority's ability to rely on the Convention and the width of the term 'public authority' under s 6, see Oliver, 'The frontiers of the State', 490-492. 7 to have intended s 6(3)(b) to apply. This is an important consideration because the term 'functions of a public nature' is so vague that judges are likely to fall back onto policy and fairness considerations when determining its meaning. 27 If the rights-stripping idea can be convincingly debunked, 28 judges should be less reluctant to extend their interpretation of the public functions term in future.
Debunking rights-stripping
Aside from courts and hybrid public authorities, which are listed as public authorities by ss 6(3)(a) and (b) respectively, the HRA is commonly acknowledged to give rise to a third species of 'core' public authority. The existence of these 'obviously' public bodies is implied by the non-exhaustive wording of s 6(3), which states that public authority 'includes' the public authorities set out in its list. Unlike hybrids, core public authorities must comply with the Convention in everything they do, whether public or private activity. This is because s 6(5) alleviates only hybridsand not core public authoritiesfrom the duty to act Convention-compatibly during private activity.
It is clear that core public authorities lack Convention rights under the HRA because the HRA affords Convention protection only to 'victims', 29 i.e. bodies who qualify as 'non- 27 In YL, n 11 above, Lord Neuberger stated, at [128] , that the words 'are so imprecise in their meaning that one searches for a policy as an aid to interpretation.' Along similar lines, see M. Elliott, '"Public" and "private": defining the scope of the Human Rights Act'[2007] CLJ 485, p. 487. 28 In YL (ibid.), at [116], Lord Mance stated that SCH, if it were a hybrid public authority, could have relied on its 'ordinary private law freedom to carry on operations under agreed contractual terms' under Art 8(2) as a defence, presumably under the 'rights and freedoms of others' qualification. His Lordship did not refer specifically to SCH's Convention rights, however, and his view that the 'rights of others' extends to a general right to contractual autonomy sits uncomfortably with Strasbourg case law to the effect that A number of judges and academic writers do seem to believe that hybrids become governmental organisations when performing public functions. 32 But this is only a tacit assumption that emerges from their view that the governmental organisation jurisprudence can assist domestic courts in identifying a public function under s 6(3)(b) (that jurisprudence must therefore extend to private bodies performing public functions in their eyes). The flimsiness of this assumption is exposed by a more detailed analysis of the Strasbourg case law with the specific task of determining the rights-status of hybrids in mind.
Aside from the definition of a governmental organisation under Art 34, there is another branch of Strasbourg jurisprudence relevant to this task. This jurisprudence relates to the issue of state responsibility. If a body acts in such a way as to affect the enjoyment by a victim of their Convention rights, that body is either an emanation of the state or it is not. If it is an emanation of the state such as a government minister, 33 the state will be directly responsible for its behaviour in Strasbourg. If the body is a private body rather than an emanation of the state, the state will only be responsible for the body's behaviour indirectly, In liberal theory, as seen above, private bodies and individuals can usually be distinguished It is difficult to see why this should be, and no explanation was proffered in Consejo General itself. It is far more natural to infer from Consejo General that the Commission regarded the GCOEA as a governmental organisation not because it was a private body performing public functions but, instead, because it was a selfless governmental organisationwhat the HRA would regard as a core public authoritycreated and controlled to serve the public interest. 37 (1995) DR 82-B. 38 Quane, 'The Strasbourg jurisprudence', 117. Rather than concluding that the governmental organisation jurisprudence fails to extend to private bodies performing governmental functions, Quane concludes that Strasbourg's 'hybrid' governmental organisation concept is unduly harsh on hybrids and urges Strasbourg to reconsider its remarks in Consejo General. In response, see Williams, 'A Fresh Perspective on Hybrid Public Authorities', 154.
Like the Art 34 jurisprudence, the state responsibility jurisprudence can be easily misread. In Costello-Roberts v United Kingdom, 39 for example, a schoolboy received corporal punishment from the headmaster of his private school and sought to claim a breach of Arts 3 and 8 in Strasbourg. The issue therefore arose as to whether the state could be responsible for the actions of the private school. Despite ruling that there had been no Convention breach on the facts, the Strasbourg court agreed with the applicant that the school engaged the state's responsibility. To support its conclusion, the court made three points. 40 
B. The chameleonic model
Acknowledging that hybrid public authorities enjoy Convention rights in their public capacities is one thing; protecting their Convention rights is another. For the most part the courts should not find this a difficult task. All they need to do is recognise that the performance by a hybrid of public functions has no bearing on its ability to make Convention claims in court. So, for example, if a local authority applies to revoke a private care home's operating licence without adequate notice of the proceedings with the result that the operator's business is destroyed, the operator should be able to allege under the HRA that the local authority has breached its rights under Art 1 of the First Protocol and Art 6. 44 The fact that the operator's business may consist of delivering contracted out residential care services, and that in the light of s 145 HSCA the operator is performing public functions under s 6(3)(b) HRA when doing so, will be irrelevant to its ability to make that claim. The same would also be true if the hybrid sought to rely defensively on its Convention rights against a public authority by way of collateral challenge, 45 or if the hybrid sought to use the common law horizontal effect mechanism to advance its Convention rights against a private defendant.
All the courts need to do is allow the hybrid to advance those claims notwithstanding that it might be doing so during the discharge of its public functions.
In one respect the situation is more problematic however, which is why the hybrid scheme should be read as generating chameleonic horizontal effect. On its face, by labelling private bodies performing public functions as public authorities, the hybrid scheme intends to treat hybrids in the same manner as core public authorities such as local authorities or government ministers in court. If a claimant brings an Art 8 claim against a local authority, for example, courts assessing the merits of that claim will work through the standard analytical formula of deciding whether there has been an interference by the local authority with the claimant's prima facie right and, if so, whether that interference is prescribed by law and has a legitimate aim according to Art 8(2). At this stage the local authority can rely on applicable Convention qualifications by claiming that it interfered with the claimant's right for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or for the prevention of disorder or crime, and so on. But complications arise if hybrids are treated in the same way as core public authorities and the court works through the same analytical process with a hybrid defendant performing public functions. Whilst hybrids might be able to avail themselves of certain 15 Convention qualifications in isolated situationsprivate prison operators could claim that they were acting for the prevention of disorder or crime by routinely intercepting prisoners' communications, for example 46they will generally find it hard to do so. As Stanley Burnton J observed at first instance in Leonard Cheshire, 'the justifications referred to in them. This is because Convention rights are deployed by a claimant indirectly in the common law context, i.e. against the court, whose duty as a public authority requires it to develop existing causes of action in a Convention-friendly fashion in order to safeguard the claimant's rights. 48 If the defendant feels that developing the common law in this way would infringe its own rights, it can plead those rights as a defence to the claimant's claim because the court, as a public authority, can claim that it is acting for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 'others' (i.e. the defendant's Convention rights) by doing so. 49 The court then balances the competing rights to see which should prevail.
So if the claimant deploys his or her Convention rights indirectly, against the court, the defendant has no difficulty asserting its own Convention rights in response. To avoid the risk of rights-stripping hybrids by failing to attach sufficient weight to the horizontal nature of the hybrid scheme, the hybrid scheme should be interpreted in the same way. This is the 'chameleonic' reading of the hybrid scheme. Although the scheme creates an ostensibly vertical framework of rights protection against a private body by designating it a public authority, the framework switches to take on a more horizontal character when the dispute gets underway. When in court, the claimant should be taken, as in the common law context, to assert their rights through the court rather than directly against the hybrid defendant itself.
C. Why the model works
Not only does the chameleonic model fully guarantee the ability of hybrid public authorities to rely on the Convention; it also exposes the hybrid scheme as giving rise to a form of horizontal effect similar to that which seems to operate in the parallel common law context.
The hybrid scheme, properly understood, contains elements of vertical and horizontal effect. brand new Convention-based causes of action. 51 Their view, instead, is that they must develop existing causes of action in a Convention-friendly fashion. Little evidence suggests that the courts subscribe to the 'weak' model of indirect horizontal effect which requires them simply to consider and balance the values contained in the Convention against existing common law factors. 52 Rather, judges seem to regard themselves as bound to develop those causes of action consistently with Convention rights. In other words, they apply those Convention rights, 53 which supplant the existing law with Convention norms, 54 between the claimant and defendant to the dispute. 55 This is not to suggest that the chameleonic model is identical in nature and scope to the model adopted by the courts in the common law context, however. First, it is clear that the remedial provisions differ under each scheme. The court's remedial powers are governed by s 8 HRA under the hybrid scheme whereas the court awards remedies according to its own 58 Ibid. 59 and Parliament has provided for domestic remedies in each situation using other schemes of liability under the HRA. If the claimant's rights are interfered with by what Strasbourg would regard as an emanation of the state, the claimant can pursue a direct claim against that body as a core public authority under s 6 HRA. 63 If the behaviour emanates instead from a private person whose behaviour the state is under a positive obligation to regulate, the claimant can pursue a remedy through the common law horizontal effect mechanism, as seen above.
Provided that the subject matter of the claimant's complaint falls within the scope of an applicable Convention right, in the hybrid context it is not necessary for the claimant to show 60 For criticism of the courts' approach to damages under the HRA see chapter XXX by Jason Varuhas. 61 See chapter XXX. 62 See above, pp.000-000. 63 The governmental organisation and core public authority categories seem to be coterminous: see above, pp. 000-000 and Aston Cantlow, n 19 above, at 
D. Conclusion
Whilst it previously appears to have gone unrecognised, hybrid public authorities do in fact enjoy Convention rights of their own under the HRA during the performance of public 64 Campbell, n 51 above, at [132] (Baroness Hale). 65 Judges in more recent cases have even referred to the newly-developed aspects of the law as a tort of misuse of private information in recognition of the nature and extent of that development: see e.g. McKennitt v Ash, n 57 above, at [ functions. The prevailing academic and judicial assumption that a hybrid is somehow 'stripped' of Convention rights in its public capacity is a myth. Not only does this confirm that hybrids can use their Convention rights to mount challenges against other public authorities when acting publicly; it also opens up a valuable line of defence to hybrids who find themselves on the receiving end of Convention claims in court. In order to ensure that hybrids can make use of this defence, however, the hybrid scheme should be read as generating chameleonic horizontal effect.
Properly understood in this way and juxtaposed against the courts' treatment of the horizontality issue in the parallel common law context, the hybrid scheme is far riper for expansion in scope than the judges appear to believe. The courts' own case law in the common law context indicates that they should not regard expanding s 6(3)(b) to include contracted out public services as causing undue harm to hybrid defendants. The width of the term 'functions of a public nature' under s 6(3)(b) is not the only factor responsible for determining the defendant's liability in court. Even if a claimant succeeds in demonstrating that a private defendant performs public functions, the claimant must then show, if the hybrid asserts its own Convention right in response, that the claimant's Convention right should prevail. It is at this stage that the court will be able to conduct an intricate and contextsensitive balancing exercise between the competing rights. 66 This is the forum in which judges should air and accord due weight to any concerns that they might harbour about the impact on the defendant if the claimant's claim is upheld. Foreclosing the issue at the
